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CONCLUSION
Marlise Muñoz was approximately fourteen weeks pregnant
when she suffered a pulmonary embolism, and two days later doctors
declared her brain-dead. Knowing Marlise’s end-of-life wishes, her
husband, Erick Muñoz, asked her doctors to withdraw or withhold
any “life-sustaining” medical treatment from his brain-dead wife. The
hospital refused, and it relied on a Texas statute that automatically
invalidates a woman’s advance directive in the event she is pregnant.
Ultimately, the trial court held that the Texas statute does not apply
to a woman who is brain-dead and pregnant.
This tragic situation warrants action to ensure that a woman’s
end-of-life wishes are honored by family members, health care provid-
ers, and the state. Louisiana has already taken action. In response
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to the Muñoz case, in June 2014 the Louisiana legislature amended
the state’s advance directive statute. Yet, based on the plain language
of the statutes in Texas and Louisiana, the pregnancy exclusions do
not apply to a situation in which a woman is brain-dead and pregnant,
and this holds true for other state statutory pregnancy exclusions.
Even if the pregnancy exclusions do apply to a pregnant woman who
is brain-dead, they arguably violate a woman’s constitutional rights,
including the right to terminate a pregnancy and the right to refuse
medical treatment.
Therefore, state legislatures should propose a statute or amend
the language in current pregnancy exclusions to clarify the appli-
cability to a woman who is brain-dead and pregnant. State legisla-
tures should also amend any statutory forms that address a woman’s
end-of-life wishes, and both attorneys and health care providers
should be proactive and discuss the issue with their respective clients
and patients.
INTRODUCTION
Erick Muñoz and Marlise Muñoz were married in 2013 and
worked as paramedics in Fort Worth, Texas.1 As knowledgeable
health care providers, they frequently discussed their end-of-life
wishes with each other and also expressed their desires to family
members and friends: they did not want to be on life support under
any circumstance.2 Unfortunately, on November 26, 2013, Erick
Muñoz awoke to find his wife unconscious on their kitchen floor.3 At
the time, his wife was approximately 14 weeks pregnant with their
second child.4 Despite attempts to save her life after she suffered a
1. Plaintiff’s First Amended Original Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Appli-
cation for Unopposed Expedited Relief at 3, Muñoz v. John Peter Smith Hosp., No. 096-
270080-14 (96th Judicial Dist. Court, Tarrant Cnty., Tex. Jan. 23, 2014), 2014 WL 285057
[hereinafter Plaintiff’s Petition].
2. Marlise Muñoz did not leave any written advance directive regarding her end-of-
life wishes, but she discussed her wishes many times with her husband and family.
Catherine E. Shoichet, Husband of Brain-Dead Texas Woman: ‘I Asked God to Take Me
Instead’, CNN (Jan. 30, 2014, 6:55 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/01/29/health/texas
-pregnant-brain-dead-woman/index.html, archived at http://perma.cc/SC6Y-XQ6D.
3. Plaintiff’s Petition, supra note 1, at 3. It is unclear how long Marlise Muñoz went
without oxygen, although she is thought to have been unconscious for about an hour
before receiving any medical care. Jacquielynn Floyd, Marlise Muñoz Case Was About
Bureaucracy, Politics—and Cruelty, DALLAS MORNING NEWS (Jan. 27, 2014, 1:57 PM),
http://www.dallasnews.com/news/columnists/jacuielynn-floyd/20140127-marlise-munoz
-case-was-about-bureaucracy-politics----and-cruelty.ece, archived at http://perma.cc/37A9
-5WE5; see also Bill Chappell, Judge Tells Hospital To Take Pregnant Woman Off Life
Support, NPR (Jan. 24, 2014, 5:47 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2014
/01/24/265785603/judge-tells-hospital-to-take-pregnant-woman-off-life-support, archived
at http://perma.cc/9KBX-78GM.
4. Plaintiff’s Petition, supra note 1, at 3.
2015] “BUT I’M BRAIN-DEAD AND PREGNANT” 671
suspected pulmonary embolism,5 doctors declared Marlise Muñoz
brain-dead6 on November 28, 2013.7
Marlise Muñoz’s husband and parents expressed her wish not
to remain on life support or to receive any life-sustaining medical
treatment.8 The hospital, however, refused to remove her from life sup-
port, citing Section 166.049 of the Texas Health and Safety Code as
the basis for its refusal.9 This refusal to follow Marlise Muñoz’s end-
of-life wishes prompted her husband to file suit against the hospital
to force the doctors to remove her from life support.10
In Muñoz v. John Peter Smith Hospital, Erick Muñoz opposed the
doctors performing any further medical treatment on his wife’s body.11
5. Upon her arrival at the John Peter Smith Hospital in Fort Worth, doctors put
Marlise Muñoz on ICU technologies, including a ventilator. Arthur L. Caplan & Thaddeus
M. Pope, Pregnant and Dead in Texas: A Bad Law, Badly Interpreted, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 16,
2014), http://articles.latimes.com/2014/jan/16/opinion/la-oe-caplan-pope-texas-pregnancy
-life-support-20140116-story.html, archived at http://perma.cc/W42B-YUZX.
6. Jeffrey L. Ecker, Death in Pregnancy—An American Tragedy, 370 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 889, 889–91 (2014), available at http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJM
p1400969, archived at http://perma.cc//LE5C-KJ9G; see TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
ANN. § 671.001 (West 2013) (setting forth the standard used in determining death). More-
over, under the Uniform Determination of Death Act, an individual is dead when he or
she “has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory func-
tions, or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain
stem.” UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT § 1, 12A (1980); see also Jacque Wilson &
Jen Christensen, Why Brain Dead Means Really Dead, CNN (Jan. 7, 2014, 2:03 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2014/01/06/health/brain-dead-basics/, archived at http://perma.cc
/FJX5-D5AB (explaining that the American Academy of Neurology updated its brain death
guidelines for adults in 2010 and “ ‘brain death’ means both the upper and lower part of
the brain are not functioning”).
7. Plaintiff’s Petition, supra note 1, at 3 (explaining that medical records confirm that
doctors declared Marlise Muñoz “brain dead since approximately November 28, 2013”).
8. Id. at 3–4.
9. Id. at 4; see also TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.049 (West 2013) (“A
person may not withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treatment under this [advance
directive] subchapter from a pregnant patient.”).
10. See Plaintiff’s Petition, supra note 1, at 1–7. In a similar case in Texas in July
1999, Tammy Martin was pregnant and in a coma when she was admitted to a hospital in
the Houston area. Emma Murphy Sisti, Die Free or Live: The Constitutionality of New
Hampshire’s Living Will Pregnancy Exception, 30 VT. L. REV. 143, 143 (2005). Her family
members wanted the doctors to discontinue the life-sustaining treatment, but the father
of the fetus, who claimed to be Tammy Martin’s common-law husband, wanted to have the
life-sustaining treatment continued indefinitely. Id. Initially, the court ordered the hos-
pital to continue life-sustaining treatment for Tammy Martin. Id. A few weeks later, how-
ever, the court reversed its order after health care providers declared Tammy Martin
brain-dead. Id.
11. Erick Muñoz wanted the court to issue an order requiring the hospital: (1) to
immediately cease conducting any further medical procedures on his wife’s body, (2) to
remove her from any respirators, ventilators, or other “life support,” and (3) to release
her body to her family. Plaintiff’s Petition, supra note 1, at 3–4; see also Caplan & Pope,
supra note 5 (“The only question in Fort Worth is who knows best what to do when a body
is being used as an incubator for a nonviable and possibly damaged fetus: a woman and
her family or the Legislature of Texas?”).
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His lawsuit against the hospital included three basic arguments. First,
he argued that the hospital misconstrued Section 166.049 of the
Texas Health and Safety Code, which on its face disallows a doctor
from withdrawing or withholding life-sustaining treatment from a
pregnant patient.12 Second, in the alternative, he argued that Section
166.049 constituted a violation of his wife’s right to privacy pursu-
ant to the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and article I, section 3 of the Texas Constitution.13 And third, in the
further alternative, he asserted that the hospital’s interpretation of
Section 166.049 constituted a violation of his wife’s right to equal
protection of the law pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause of the
Texas Constitution.14
The hospital, on the other hand, maintained that the Texas
legislature has expressed a strong interest in protecting the life of
an unborn child.15 More specifically, the hospital argued that “it is un-
likely the Legislature contemplated only the welfare of the mother”
when it enacted the statute prohibiting the withholding or with-
drawal of life-sustaining medical treatment for pregnant patients.16
In addition, the hospital contended that the pregnancy exclusion in
Section 166.049 “is constitutional because the right of privacy is not
12. Plaintiff’s Petition, supra note 1, at 5; see also TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§ 166.049 (West 2013).
13. Plaintiff’s Petition, supra note 1, at 5.
14. Id. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, no state shall “deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also
TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3. The basic argument is that Section 166.049 violates the Equal
Protection Clause because it treats pregnant women differently from everyone else. Thus,
because Marlise Muñoz was pregnant at the time her doctors declared her brain-dead,
her health care providers treated her differently than a brain-dead woman who is not preg-
nant. See Timothy J. Burch, Incubator or Individual?: The Legal and Policy Deficiencies
of Pregnancy Clauses in Living Will and Advance Health Care Directive Statutes, 54 MD.
L. REV. 528, 551–52 (1995); Katherine A. Taylor, Compelling Pregnancy at Death’s Door,
7 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 85, 145–46 (1997).
15. For example, the Texas Penal Code defines an “individual” as a “human being who
is alive, including an unborn child at every stage of gestation from fertilization until birth.”
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(26) (West 2013). This definition would potentially allow
a person to be charged with the criminal offense of murder if an unborn child is killed. Id.
§§ 19.02, 19.03. Of course, this aspect of the Texas Penal Code is constitutionally suspect.
16. Manny Fernandez, Judge Orders Hospital to Remove Pregnant Woman From Life
Support, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/25/us/judge-orders
-hospital-to-remove-life-support-from-pregnant-woman.html, archived at http://perma
.cc/DRT8-A67B (reporting that the hospital argued it was reasonable to infer that the stat-
ute was also meant to protect the unborn child); see also Defendant’s Brief in Response to
Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel at 3, Muñoz v. John Peter Smith Hosp., No. 096-270080-14
(96th Judicial Dist. Court, Tarrant Cnty., Tex. Jan. 23, 2014) (“[I]f the legislature intended
for life sustaining treatment to be withdrawn, allowing the unborn child to die, it could
have expressed this intent by adding a second sentence to section 166.049 to the effect
that, upon the mother’s death, the healthcare providers must withdraw life sustaining
treatment and let the unborn child die.”).
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absolute and must be balanced with the state’s interest to protect the
life of an unborn child.”17
Ultimately, the trial court held that Section 166.049 of the Texas
Health and Safety Code does not apply when a health care provider
has declared a pregnant patient to be brain-dead18 and thus ordered
the hospital to remove Marlise Muñoz’s body from all life-sustaining
equipment.19 Pursuant to the trial court’s order, the doctors withdrew
Marlise Muñoz’s life-sustaining equipment on January 26, 2014,20
when the fetus was twenty-two weeks old.21
The situation the Muñoz family faced is not the first of its kind,22
17. Max B. Baker & Elizabeth Campbell, Texas Law Didn’t Anticipate Muñoz Case,
Drafters Say, STAR-TELEGRAM (Jan. 23, 2014, 10:54 PM), http://www.star-telegram.com
/news/local/community/fort-worth/article3843836.html, archived at http://perma.cc/MG5H
-PFFV.
18. Judgment, Muñoz v. John Peter Smith Hosp., No. 096-270080-14 (96th Judicial
Dist. Court, Tarrant Cnty., Tex. Jan. 24, 2014) [hereinafter Court’s Order]. In making its
decision, the trial court looked to the statutory death standards as set forth in Section
671.001 of the Texas Health and Safety Code. Id. And, because the court held that Sec-
tion 166.049 did not apply to Marlise Muñoz’s situation, the court did not rule on the con-
stitutionality of the state law. Id.
19. Id. By the time of the court hearing in late January 2014, the Muñoz family
disclosed that ultrasound exams “had revealed significant fetal abnormalities.” Ecker,
supra note 6, at 890. In addition, during the pendency of the case, the hospital also ac-
knowledged that Marlise Muñoz’s fetus was not viable. See Chappell, supra note 3.
20. Melissa Repko, Fort Worth Hospital Withdraws Life Support for Pregnant, Brain-
Dead Woman, DALLAS MORNING NEWS (Jan. 26, 2014 11:37 PM), http://www.dallasnews
.com/news/metro/20140126-fort-worth-hospital-withdraws-life-support-for-pregnant
-brain-dead-woman.ece, archived at http://perma.cc/J4TD-F83L. Marlise Muñoz’s mother,
Lynne Machado, explained that before the doctors withdrew the life-sustaining equip-
ment, her daughter’s body had begun to visibly deteriorate and decay; it was an “empty
shell of what had been her beloved daughter.” Husband of Brain Dead Woman Who Sued
to Have Pregnant Wife’s Life Support Turned Off May be Forced to Pay For Her Hospital
Stay, DAILYMAIL (Feb. 1, 2014), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2550352/Marlise
-Munoz-case-Husband-brain-dead-woman-sued-pregnant-wifes-life-support-turned
-forced-pay-hospital-stay.html, archived at http://perma.cc/C9WG-YUK7.
21. Repko, supra note 20. Moreover, since the trial court’s ruling, Marlise Muñoz’s fam-
ily has submitted a notice for intent to sue John Peter Smith Hospital. Jobin Panicker,
Family of Marlise Muñoz Fights on Against Law, Hospital, KENS5 (Oct. 31, 2014,
6:25 AM), http://www.kens5.com/story/news/2014/10/31/family-of-marlise-muoz-fights-on
-against-law-hospital/18231221, archived at http://perma.cc/65GK-WWT2.
22. Medical literature between 1982 and 2010 reveals thirty cases of brain-dead
pregnant women who received continued life support in order to facilitate development
of the fetus. Majid Esmaeilzadeh, et al., One Life Ends, Another Begins: Management of
a Brain-Dead Pregnant Mother—A Systematic Review, BMC MEDICINE 8 (2010), avail-
able at http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/pdf/1741-7015-8-74.pdf, archived at http://
perma.cc/7P5W-4CZ9. Of the reported cases, only twelve viable infants survived the neo-
natal period. Id. The mean gestational age at the time of the mother’s brain death was
twenty-two weeks, and the mean gestational age at delivery was 29.5 weeks. Id. Since
2010, other cases involving a brain-dead pregnant woman have occurred. See Abuhasna
Said, et al., A Brain-Dead Pregnant Woman With Prolonged Somatic Support and Suc-
cessful Neonatal Outcome: A Grand Rounds Case With a Detailed Review of Literature and
Ethical Considerations, 3 INT’L J. OF CRITICAL ILLNESS AND INJURY SCI. 220, 220 (2013)
(reporting a case where somatic support for 110 days lead to the delivery of a viable child
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and considering the advances in medical technology,23 it leads to a
discussion of the treatment of a pregnant woman who has been de-
clared brain-dead. So the legal question remains: should a pregnant
woman who is legally and medically dead be forced to be kept on life
support for the sake of her non-viable fetus?24 Arguably, the answer is
no. In reaching this answer, Part I of this Article examines the cur-
rent state legislation that governs withdrawing or withholding life-
sustaining medical treatment from a pregnant woman, with a focus on
both the Texas pregnancy exclusion that affected the Muñoz case and
on a recent 2014 statutory amendment in Louisiana, neither of which
adequately address the situation when a woman is brain-dead and
when the mother was declared brain-dead at sixteen weeks gestation). In 2013 in Hungary,
a woman with a fifteen-week-old fetus was declared brain-dead, and three months later
a baby boy at twenty-seven weeks old was born to the brain-dead mother. Baby Born to
Brain-Dead Mother 3 Months After Woman’s Declared Death, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 14,
2013, 1:39 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/14/baby-born-brain-dead-mother
-3-months_n_4274609.html, archived at http://perma.cc/F9PU-9MVK. In 2014 in Canada,
a woman was declared brain dead and was twenty-two weeks pregnant at the time.
Brain-Dead Canadian Woman Taken off Life Support After Giving Birth to Baby Boy,
CBSNEWS (Feb. 11, 2014, 6:34 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/brain-dead-canadian
-woman-taken-off-life-support-after-giving-birth/, archived at http://perma.cc/CR39-4D3J.
After the woman remained on life support for approximately six weeks, a baby boy was
delivered and has survived. Paula Newton, Brain-Dead Canadian Woman Dies After
Son’s Birth, CNN (Feb. 12, 2014, 7:32 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/11/health/canada
-brain-dead-pregnant-woman/, archived at http://perma.cc/UWK6-FLQF. And most re-
cently, the High Court in Ireland ruled that a brain-dead woman was 18-weeks pregnant
should be taken off life support. Henry McDonald, Brain-Dead Woman’s Life Support Can
Be Switched Off, Irish Court Rules, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 26, 2014, 8:34 PM), http://www
.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/26/ireland-court-rules-brain-dead-pregnant-womans
-life-support-switched-off, archived at http://perma.cc/F999-LGKR; see also Tim Madigan,
Few Precedents Exist in Case of Brain-Dead Pregnant Woman, STAR-TELEGRAM (Jan. 23,
2014, 6:06 PM), http://www.star-telegram.com/mobile/m-local/article3843807.html, archived
at http://perma.cc/GRU3-475M.
23. With advances in medical technology, another consideration is the expense for
maintaining a woman’s body in order to deliver a fetus. In the Muñoz case, the hospital bill
for continuing to carry the fetus and for post-birth hospital care could have totaled any-
where from $439,500 to $984,500. Sarah Wickline, A Brain-Dead Mother, a Million-Dollar
Baby, MEDPAGE TODAY (Jan. 10, 2014), http://www.medpagetoday.com/OBGYN/Pregnancy
/43736, archived at http://perma.cc/56XA-FW4Y. In this regard, “[i]nsurance coverage for
a woman that has been declared brain dead is a gray area.” Id.; see also Robert Wilonsky,
John Peter Smith Says Hospital Still Trying to Determine Who Will Pay for Brain-Dead
Woman’s 62-Day Stay, DALLAS MORNING NEWS (March 14, 2014, 12:42 PM), http://the
scoopblog.dallasnews.com/2014/03/john-peter-smith-says-hospital-still-trying-to
-determine-who-will-pay-for-brain-dead-womans-62-day-stay.html/, archived at http://
perma.cc/W8EP-SDWE.
24. Situations in which a woman who is on life support can communicate her desire
for the life support to be withdrawn and situations in which a pregnant woman with an
advance directive is in a terminal condition or in a comatose or vegetative state are both
beyond the scope of this Article. This Article addresses only the situation in which a
woman is brain-dead and pregnant with a non-viable fetus. Although this situation may
be rare, due to the Muñoz case state legislatures have started amending their advance di-
rective statutes to address the situation. See infra Part I.B.
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pregnant.25 In the event a statutory pregnancy exclusion applies to a
woman who is brain-dead and pregnant, Part II addresses a woman’s
constitutional rights that are relevant to this issue, including a
woman’s right to abortion and a woman’s right to refuse life-sustaining
treatment.26 Finally, Part III recommends changes to the state stat-
utory schemes to expressly address a pregnant woman who has been
declared brain-dead before her fetus is viable27 and also proposes lan-
guage that should be included in a woman’s end-of-life decision-
making documents. By making these necessary changes, health care
providers will be able to honor a woman’s end-of-life wishes in the
unfortunate event that she is brain-dead and pregnant.
I. STATE LEGISLATION GOVERNING LIFE-SUSTAINING MEDICAL
TREATMENT FOR PREGNANT PATIENTS
In general, a medical advance directive28 allows a competent
person to express his or her wishes concerning medical treatments in
the event he or she can no longer communicate those wishes at the
end of life,29 and all fifty states and the District of Columbia have
25. See supra note 14; see also infra notes 66–75.
26. A woman’s equal protection rights are also implicated. See supra text accompanying
note 14.
27. Viability occurs around the twenty-fifth week of pregnancy. Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 160 (1973); see also City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462
U.S. 416, 428 (1983) (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 163) (defining “viability” as the point in
which the fetus has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother’s uterus); Mary
Mahowald, Beyond Abortion: Refusal Caesarean Section, 3 BIOETHICS 106, 110 (1989) (de-
fining viability as the “fetus’s ability to survive after birth with help from neonatal inten-
sive care”). But see Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 860 (1992)
(explaining that a fetus might be viable at twenty-three weeks).
28. Because the terminology used in state statutes varies from state to state, in this
Article I use the phrase “advance directive” to globally refer to any end-of-life document
that expresses a person’s wishes and desires in regard to medical treatment, e.g., a living
will, a medical power of attorney, and a Do Not Resuscitate order. Further, “[w]hile advance
directives typically apply to the living yet incompetent, they are arguably triggered by
brain death as well” because the patient, while competent, expressed his or her desires
as to what would happen when he or she can no longer communicate those desires. Alexis
Gregorian, Post-Mortem Pregnancy: A Proposed Methodology for the Resolution of Conflicts
over Whether a Brain Dead Pregnant Woman Should Be Maintained on Life-Sustaining
Treatment, 19 ANNALS HEALTH L. 401, 412 (2010), available at http://lawecommons.luc.edu
/annals/vol19/iss2/6, archived at http://perma.cc/UP4W-PHN7; see also Janice MacAvoy-
Snitzer, Note, Pregnancy Clauses in Living Will Statutes, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1280, 1284
(1987). In fact, although Marlise Muñoz’s death differs from the typical situation in which
an advance directive is operative, i.e., when she did not have a written advance directive
and when her death was impending, the hospital still applied the pregnancy exclusion
in Section 166.049 of the Texas Health and Safety Code.
29. MacAvoy-Snitzer, supra note 28, at 1280 (“Living will statutes provide legislatively
defined mechanisms for exercising the constitutional right to bodily integrity, which en-
compasses the right of competent individuals to designate the course of their medical
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statutes that govern advance directives.30 Many states, however, have
included a pregnancy clause, or pregnancy exclusion, to their advance
directive statutes to disallow the application of a woman’s advance di-
rective when a she is pregnant.31 In this regard, the Center for Women
Policy Studies categorizes state statutes addressing pregnancy in
this situation into four major categories.32 This Article will consider
the following five categories:
1. The pregnancy exclusion automatically invalidates a
woman’s advance directive, regardless of the stage of
her pregnancy;33
treatment.”) (citing In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 662–64 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 922 (1976)).
30. In 1976, California became the first state to enact a living will statute. See Bretton
J. Horttor, A Survey of Living Will and Advanced Health Care Directives, 74 N.D. L. REV.
233, 233–40 (1998) (surveying state advance directives). The laws governing advance
directives, however, vary from state to state, e.g., witness and notary requirements, and
the effect of divorce. Id. Accordingly, a woman should confirm that her advance directive
executed in one state will be honored in another state.
31. According to Katherine A. Taylor, a lawyer and bioethicist at Drexel University,
these restrictive provisions helped “ease the qualms of the Roman Catholic church and
others” about advance directives. Manny Fernandez & Erik Eckholm, Pregnant, and
Forced to Stay on Life Support, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014
/01/08/us/pregnant-and-forced-to-stay-on-life-support.html, archived at http://perma.cc
/776Q-FU2L; Burch, supra note 14, at 537 (“[T]he majority of states . . . give a woman
fewer constitutional and common-law rights if she is pregnant and incompetent than if
she were either (a) competent and pregnant, (b) competent and chose to have an abortion
before fetal viability, or (c) incompetent and with a prior directive.”).
32. MEGAN GREENE & LESLIE R. WOLFE, PREGNANCY EXCLUSIONS IN STATE LIVING




33. ALA. CODE § 22-8A-4(e) (2014) (“The advance directive for health care of a declarant
who is known by the attending physician to be pregnant shall have no effect during the
course of the declarant’s pregnancy.”); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-574 (West 2014)
(“nonapplicability (sic) to pregnant patient”); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-4510 (West 2014)
(statutory form states that “[i]f I have been diagnosed as pregnant, this Directive shall
have no force during the course of my pregnancy”); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-36-4-8(d) (West
2014) (“The living will declaration of a person diagnosed as pregnant by the attending
physician has no effect during the person’s pregnancy.”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28,103(a)
(West 2014) (“The declaration of a qualified patient diagnosed as pregnant by the at-
tending physician shall have no effect during the course of the qualified patient’s preg-
nancy.”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.625 (West 2014) (statutory form states that “[i]f I have
been diagnosed as pregnant and that diagnosis is known to my attending physician, this
directive shall have no force or effect during the course of my pregnancy”); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 700.5512(1) (West 2014) (“A patient advocate cannot make a medical treat-
ment decision under the authority of or under the process created by this section . . . to
withhold or withdraw treatment from a pregnant patient that would result in the pregnant
patient’s death.”); MO. ANN. STAT. § 459.025 (West 2014) (“The declaration to withdraw
or withhold treatment by a patient diagnosed as pregnant by the attending physician
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2. The pregnancy exclusion is similar to those suggested
in the Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act, which
includes language as to the probability of the fetus
developing to a live birth;34
3. The pregnancy exclusion includes a fetus viability stan-
dard that determines enforceability of the directive;35
4. The pregnancy clause creates a presumption in favor
of life-sustaining treatment, which may be rebutted by
a woman’s advance directive;36 and,
5. No state statute addresses the validity of an advance
directive when a woman is pregnant.37
shall have no effect during the course of the declarant’s pregnancy.”); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 44-77-70 (West 2014) (“If a declarant has been diagnosed as pregnant, the Declaration
is not effective during the course of the declarant’s pregnancy.”); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE ANN. § 166.049 (West 2013); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2a-123 (West 2014) (“A health
care directive that provides for the withholding or withdrawal of life sustaining pro-
cedures has no force during the course of the declarant’s pregnancy.”); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 70.122.030(1)(d) (West 2014) (“If I have been diagnosed as pregnant and that diag-
nosis is known to my physician, this directive shall have no force or effect during the course
of my pregnancy.”); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 154.03 (West 2013) (“If you [the attending physician]
know that the patient is pregnant, this document has no effect during her pregnancy.”).
34. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws drafted the
Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act and suggested a model law covering living wills
where a person is in a terminal condition, and the suggested model law states that “[l]ife-
sustaining treatment must not be withheld or withdrawn pursuant to a declaration from
an individual known to the attending physician to be pregnant so long as it is probable
that the fetus will develop to the point of live birth with the continued application of life-
sustaining treatment.” UNIFORM RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL ACT § 6(c) (1989), avail-
able at http://www.lawandbioethics.com/demo/Main/Media/Resources/UniformRightsOf
TerminallyIllAct.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/A3UR-GP3W. States taking this approach
to pregnancy include the following: ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 13.52.055 (West 2014); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3262 (West 2014); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-206(c) (West 2014); 755
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 35/3(c) (West 2014); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.6(2) (West 2014); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1299.58.10(E), 40:1299.64.6(D) (West 2014), MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 145B.13(3) (West 2014); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-106(7) (West 2014); NEB. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 20-408 (West 2014); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 449.624 (West 2014); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 137-J:10 (West 2014); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN.  § 23.06.5-09 (West 2013); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 1337.13 (West 2014); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 5429 (West 2014); R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 23-4.11-6 (West 2014); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-12D-10 (West 2014).
35. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-18-104 (West 2014); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2503(j)
(West 2014); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.113(2) (West 2014); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-9(a)(1)
(West 2014).
36. MD. CODE ANN. HEALTH-GEN. § 5-603 (West 2014); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145B.13
(West 2014); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-56 (West 2014) (“[A] female declarant may include
in an advance directive, information as to what effect the directive shall have if she is
pregnant.”); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63 § 3101.4 (West 2014); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18
§ 9702(8) (West 2014).
37. See CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 4670–4701 (West 2014); D.C. CODE §§ 7-621–7-630 (2013);
HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 327E-1–327E-16 (West 2014); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, §§ 5-
802–5-817 (2013); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. CH. 201D, §§ 1–17 (West 2014); MISS. CODE
ANN. §§ 41-41-209–41-41-229 (West 2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7A-1–24-7A-17 (West
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A. Texas Advance Directive Pregnancy Exclusion
The seminal point in regard to the advance directive pregnancy
exclusions explained above is that many state statutes arguably do
not apply when the woman is brain-dead and pregnant with a non-
viable fetus.38 This was the first argument made by Marlise Muñoz’s
husband,39 and the court held that the advance directive pregnancy
exclusion set out in Section 166.049 of the Texas Health and Safety
Code did not apply to her situation because she was no longer a
“patient” when brain-dead.40 Thus, the court in Muñoz v. John Peter
Hospital is the first Texas court to hold that a pregnancy exclusion
does not apply to a woman who is brain-dead and pregnant.41 Accord-
ingly, Section 166.049 of the Texas Health and Safety Code is the
prime example to illustrate how the pregnancy exclusions catego-
rized above should not apply when woman is brain-dead and pregnant
with a non-viable fetus.42 It also reiterates the need for state legisla-
tures to take action to clarify the applicability of their current preg-
nancy exclusions when a woman is brain-dead and pregnant.43
In Texas, the Texas Advance Directives Act (the “Texas Act”) sets
out the statutory procedures by which a person may provide an “ad-
vance directive” 44 to his or her physician regarding life-sustaining
medical procedures in the event he or she has a terminal or irrevers-
ible condition.45 Under the Texas Act, a person may take three means
2014); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2980–2994 (McKinney 2014); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 90-320–90-323 (West 2014); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.505–127.660 (West 2014); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 32-11-101–32-11-113 (West 2014); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-2981–54.1-2993
(West 2014); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-30-2–16-30-13 (West 2014); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-
22-401–35-22-416 (West 2014).
38. See, e.g., Plaintiff’s Petition, supra note 1, at 4.
39. Id. at 5; see also Plaintiff’s First Amended Motion to Compel Defendants to Remove
Marlise Muñoz From “Life Sustaining” Measures and Application for Unopposed Expedited
Relief at 2–4, Muñoz v. John Peter Smith Hosp., No. 096-270080-14 (96th Judicial Dist.
Court, Tarrant Cnty., Tex. Jan. 23, 2014), 2014 WL 285054.
40. Court’s Order, supra note 18.
41. Id.
42. The Texas statute automatically invalidates the effect of a woman’s advance di-
rective, regardless of the stage of her pregnancy, but the same rationale applies to other
categories of pregnancy exclusions, as they all contemplate some type of “life-sustaining”
treatment for a pregnant woman who is still alive. See supra notes 33–36; see also TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.049 (West 2013).
43. See infra Part III.
44. Under the Texas Act, the term “advance directive” encompasses the following: (a)
a directive, or living will, (b) an out-of-hospital Do Not Resuscitate order, or (c) “a medical
power of attorney.” TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.002(1) (West 2013).
45. Id. §§ 166.001–166.66; see also id. § 166.031, Revisor’s n. 2 (explaining that the
“definition of ‘life-sustaining procedure’ ” was revised to use the term “postpone” the mo-
ment of death “to more accurately reflect legislative intent,” as the term “postpone” is also
used in the definition of “terminal condition”). Further, an advance directive or similar
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by which he or she may control the amount and type of medical care.46
First, a competent47 person may execute an advance directive, or
living will, to physicians and family members to retain some control
over medical decisions in the event of a terminal or irreversible
condition.48 Second, a person may execute an out-of-hospital “Do Not
Resuscitate” (DNR) order.49 And third, a person may execute a medi-
cal power of attorney, or healthcare proxy.50 If a person has not taken
instrument validly executed in another jurisdiction will be given the same effect as an
advance directive validly executed under Texas law. Id. § 166.005.
46. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.002(1)(a)–(c) (West 2013).
47. Id. § 166.002(4) (defining “competent” as “possessing the ability, based on reason-
able medical judgment, to understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of a
treatment decision, including the significant benefits and harms of and reasonable alter-
natives to a proposed treatment decision”).
48. Id. §§ 166.031–166.051. A “directive,” or living will, refers to an instruction to
“administer, withhold, or withdraw life-sustaining treatment in the event of a terminal
or irreversible condition.” Id. § 166.031(1). A person also may identify specific treatments
that he or she does or does not want in specific circumstances. Id. § 166.033. In addition,
in the directive a person may designate another person to make treatment decisions on
his or her behalf in the event he or she becomes incompetent or otherwise incapable of
communication. Id. § 166.033(c); see also TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.038(b).
For a written advance directive to be effective, the person must sign the directive in the
presence of two qualified witnesses, who must also sign the document, or the person
must sign the directive and have the signature acknowledged before a notary public. Id.
§ 166.163(b). A competent adult also may issue a non-written advance directive in the
presence of the attending physician and two witnesses. Id. § 166.034(b). A suggested ad-
vance directive form is found in Section 166.033 of the Texas Health and Safety Code and
includes the following language:
This is an important legal document known as an Advance Directive. It is
designed to help you communicate your wishes about medical treatment at
some time in the future when you are unable to make your wishes known
because of illness or injury. These wishes are usually based on personal
values, in particular, you may want to consider what burdens or hardships
of treatment you would be willing to accept for a particular amount of benefit
obtained if you were seriously ill. . . . If, in the judgment of my physician, I
am suffering with a terminal condition which I am expected to die within six
months, even with available life-sustaining treatment provided in accor-
dance with prevailing standards of medical care . . . I request that I be kept
alive in this terminal condition using available life-sustaining treatment . . .
I understand that under Texas law this directive has no effect if I have been
diagnosed as pregnant.
Id. § 166.033 (emphasis added). Thus, the suggested language in regard to pregnancy is
consistent with the pregnancy exclusion in Section 166.049. Finally, a person may revoke
his or her advance directive by physically destroying the directive, by executing a written
revocation, or by making an oral statement of his or her “intent to revoke the directive.”
Id. § 166.042.
49. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 166.081–166.101, 166.082(a) (DNR instructs
health care professionals acting in an out-of-hospital setting to withhold some life-sustain-
ing medical treatments). A statutory DNR form is provided, and like a person’s living will,
a DNR may be unwritten. See id. §§ 166.083, 166.084.
50. Id. §§ 166.151–166.166. (medical power of attorney permits the designated agent
to make health care decisions on behalf of the incompetent person’s behalf that the person
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one of these steps to express his or her wishes, medical decisions
regarding the withholding or withdrawing of life-sustaining treat-
ment are entrusted a relative. . . guardian, or agent.51
Specifically in regard to a living will, under Section 166.049 of
the Texas Health and Safety Code52 “[a] person may not withdraw
or withhold life-sustaining treatment under this subchapter from a
pregnant53 patient.” 54 Thus, Texas is one of the states that automat-
ically invalidates a pregnant woman’s end-of-life directive, regard-
less of the stage of pregnancy, and the statute does not allow any
exception to the umbrella directive that doctors may not withdraw or
withhold life-sustaining treatment when the patient is pregnant.55
The result is that pregnancy completely suspends the operation of
an advance directive during the course of the pregnancy.56 Section
166.049, however, arguably does not apply to a woman who is brain-
dead and pregnant and thwarts the stated wishes of the woman.57
could make if he or she was competent); see also id. § 166.152 (listing out certain exceptions
to the health care decisions that a designated person can make, including the decision to
abort a fetus); id. § 166.164 (providing a statutory form for a medical power of attorney).
51. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 166.039, 166.088 (West 2013).
52. The sub-chapter addressing living wills states that it “does not impair or supersede
any legal right or responsibility a person may have to affect the withholding or withdrawal
of life-sustaining treatment in a lawful manner . . . .” Id. § 166.051. Thus, the Texas Act
is nonexclusive and leaves other legal structures in place for situations not addressed in
the Act. And arguably, because Marlise Muñoz did not have an effective written or non-
written advance directive pursuant to Sections 166.023 and 166.034 of the Texas Health
and Safety Code, the hospital should not have employed the pregnancy exclusion in
Section 166.049 in the first place.
53. This raises the question: Must a health care provider be required to perform a
pregnancy test on every patient of child-bearing years? The pregnancy exclusion suspends
the effectiveness of an advance directive for a patient who is pregnant, not for a patient
who knows she is pregnant. Id. §166.049 (referring only to a “pregnant patient”). Thus, a
physician or health care provider would need to perform a pregnancy test on every patient
of child-bearing years, whether or not she has the capacity to answer questions about her
health status. See Anne E. Malley, TEX. FAM. L. SERV. § 52:26, Pregnancy (West 2010); see
also Ecker, supra note 6, at 890 (explaining that the Muñoz’s attorney argued that “if the
hospital’s approach were taken to its utilitarian conclusion, paramedics arriving at accident
scenes would need to do on-site pregnancy tests to know which bodies to ventilate.”).
54. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.049 (West 2013); id. § 166.098 (“A person
may not withhold cardiopulmonary resuscitation or certain other life-sustaining treat-
ment . . . from a person known by the responding health care professionals to be preg-
nant.”). In regard to the drafting of Section 166.049, Thomas Mayo, an associate professor
who assisted in its drafting, stated that “[i]t never would have occurred to us that any-
thing in the statute applied to anyone who was dead. The statute was meant for making
treatment decisions for patients with [only] terminal or irreversible conditions.” Jacque
Mingle, States Differ on Whether Living Wills Are Followed During Pregnancy, BOGUTZ
& GORDON (Jan. 31, 2014), http://bogutzandgordon.com/states-differ-on-whether-living
-wills-are-followed-during-pregnancy/, archived at http://perma.cc/A7ZF-TBN5.
55. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.049 (West 2013).
56. Id.
57. Id.
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In this regard, a consideration of basic statutory construction58 leads
to the conclusion that Section 169.049 requires that only a living preg-
nant woman be kept alive; it does not require that a woman who is
both brain-dead and pregnant be subjected to treatment.59
Because an advance directive refers to an instruction to “admin-
ister, withhold, or withdraw life-sustaining treatment in the event
of a terminal or irreversible condition,” 60 several other definitions are
relevant to construing the Texas pregnancy exclusion and determin-
ing whether or not it applies to a woman who is brain-dead and
pregnant. As defined in the Texas Act, “ ‘life-sustaining treatment’
means treatment that, based on reasonable medical judgment, sus-
tains the life of a patient and without which the patient will die.” 61
58. In determining the legislative intent behind a statute, the court should first
examine the plain language of the statute. Hernandez v. Ebrom, 289 S.W.3d 316, 318
(Tex. 2009). Thus, where the language of the statute is unambiguous and its meaning is
clear, the court should give effect to the statute according to its literal terms. Id. If the court
cannot discern legislative intent from the plain language of the statute, then the court
may utilize the canons of construction and other extrinsic aids for guidance in determin-
ing the statute’s meaning. See, e.g., Texas Lottery Comm’n v. First State Bank of DeQueen,
325 S.W.3d 628, 637–38 (Tex. 2010). Yet, when the application of the statute’s plain lan-
guage would lead to absurd consequences that the legislature could not possibly have in-
tended, a court should not apply the literal language. Ex parte Noyola, 215 S.W.3d 862,
866–67 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). In addition to common-law canons, Texas has statutory
guidelines for statutory construction. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 311.023 (West 2013).
Under the Texas Construction Act, courts should resort to extrinsic aids of construction
regardless of whether a statutory provision is ambiguous. Id. Specifically, when constru-
ing a statute courts should consider the following: (1) “the object sought to be attained;”
(2) the circumstances under which the statute was enacted; (3) common law or other stat-
utory provisions, “including laws on the same or similar subjects;” (4) “consequences of
a particular construction;” (5) “administrative construction of the statute;” and (6) “the title,
preamble, and emergency provision.” Helena Chem. Co. v. Wilkins, 47 S.W.3d 486, 493
(Tex. 2001). But see Fitzgerald v. Advanced Spine Fixation Sys., 996 S.W.2d 864, 865–66
(“[I]f a statute is unambiguous, rules of construction or other extrinsic aids cannot be
used to create ambiguity.”); Nat’l Liab. & Fire Ins. Co. v. Allen, 15 S.W.3d 525, 527 (Tex.
2000) (“If possible, we must ascertain the Legislature’s intent from the language it used in
the statute and not look to extraneous matters for an intent the statute does not state.”).
59. See Thomas Wm. Mayo, Brain-Dead and Pregnant in Texas, 14 THE AM. J. OF
BIOETHICS, 15, 15–18 (Aug. 2014) (discussing the inapplicability of the Texas Advance
Directive Act to patients who have died as well as the inapplicability of the Texas Act’s
pregnancy-exclusion provision to pregnant cadavers); Valerie Longmire-Jefferis, Termi-
nation of Pregnancy Pre-Viability and the Dilemma of Maternal Artificial Life Support:
An Examination of Texas State Law and Advance Directives, HEALTH L. PERSP. (Sept. 25,
2014, 1:21 PM), http://www.law.uh.edu/healthlaw/perspectives/2014/Longmire-Jefferis
_Termination%20of%20Pregnancy%20Pre-Viability%20and%20the%Dilemma%20of%20
Maternal.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/HS9R-FQLW.
60. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.031(1) (West 2013).
61.  Id. § 166.002(10) (emphasis added). Further, “[t]he term includes both life-
sustaining medications and artificial life support, such as mechanical breathing machines,
kidney dialysis treatment, and artificial nutrition and hydration. The term does not include
the administration of pain management medication or the performance of medical proce-
dure considered to be necessary to provide comfort care, or any other medical care pro-
vided to alleviate a patient’s pain.” Id. (emphasis added).
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In addition, “ ‘terminal condition’ means an incurable condition caused
by injury, disease, or illness that according to reasonable medical judg-
ment will produce death within six months, even with available life-
sustaining treatment provided in accordance with the prevailing
standard of medical care.” 62 Furthermore:
irreversible condition means a condition, injury, or illness: (A) that
may be treated but is never cured or eliminated; (B) that leaves
a person unable to care for or make decisions for the person’s own
self; and (C) that, without life-sustaining treatment provided in ac-
cordance with the prevailing standard of medical care, is fatal.63
Moreover, the Texas pregnancy exclusion uses the terms “life-
sustaining treatment” and “patient,” 64 so the literal language of the
exclusion itself requires that the person must be living in order for
him or her to be subjected to life support.65
Thus, based on the express language of the statutory definitions
relevant to Section 166.049 and based on the plain language of Sec-
tion 166.049, the pregnancy exclusion does not apply when a woman
is legally dead under Texas law66 and pregnant with a non-viable
fetus. Indeed, the concept of “life support” for someone who has been
declared brain-dead is an oxymoron because the life of the “patient”
can no longer be sustained; he or she is legally and medically dead
and is not a “patient.” 67 Accordingly, the Texas pregnancy exclusion
does not apply to a situation in which a woman is brain-dead and
pregnant.68 Similarly, comparable pregnancy exclusions across the
country also should not apply to such a situation.69
62. Id. § 166.002(13) (emphasis added).
63. Id. § 166.002(9) (emphasis added).
64. Id. § 166.049.
65. MacAvoy-Snitzer, supra note 28, at 1281 (explaining that in a typical statute, life-
sustaining treatment refers to treatment that only “prolongs the dying process”).
66. Section 671.001 of the Texas Health and Safety Code states, in relevant part:
(a) A person is dead when, according to ordinary standards of medical practice,
there is irreversible cessation of the person’s spontaneous respiratory and
circulatory functions. (b) If artificial means of support preclude a determi-
nation that a person’s spontaneous respiratory and circulatory functions
have ceased, the person is dead when, in the announced opinion of the physi-
cian, according to ordinary standards of medical practice, there is irreversible
cessation of all spontaneous brain function. Death occurs when the relevant
functions cease.
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 671.001 (West 2013). In the Muñoz case, there was
no dispute that Marlise Muñoz was brain-dead as of November 28, 2013. Plaintiff’s Petition,
supra note 1, at 3.
67. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.002(10).
68. See infra Part II.B.
69. The outcome of issues surrounding the Louisiana pregnancy exclusion statute
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B. Louisiana’s 2014 Statutory Amendment
In response to the issues raised by the case in Texas involving
Marlise Muñoz,70 in early 2014 the Louisiana legislature acted swiftly
to address the exceptional situation in which a pregnant woman is
declared brain-dead.71 House Bill 1274, passed by the Louisiana state
legislature in early June72 and signed into law by the Governor on
June 23, 2004,73 “essentially prohibits withdrawing life support for
a pregnant woman if the obstetrician has determined that the fetus
is at least 20-weeks gestation and that the pregnant woman’s bodily
functions can reasonably be maintained to support the continued de-
velopment and live birth of the fetus.” 74
In general, under Louisiana’s advance directive law “all persons
have the fundamental right to control the decisions relating to their
own medical care.” 75 In this regard, “[a]ny adult person may, at any
time, make a written declaration directing the withholding or with-
drawal of life-sustaining procedures in the event such person should
have a terminal and irreversible condition.” 76 Furthermore, the
showcases why pregnancy exclusions should not apply to the situation in which a woman
is brain-dead and pregnant. See infra Part II.B.
70. Representative Austin Badon proposed the measure in response to the Muñoz
case in Texas. Clare Kim, Louisiana Bill Would Keep Brain-Dead Pregnant Women on Life
Support, MSNBC (June 9, 2014, 10:21 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/the-last-word/gov
-jindal-brain-dead-pregnant-life-support-bill, archived at http://perma.cc/SMM7-79E6.
71. H.B. 1274, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2014).
72. The House passed the bill 87 to 1, and the Senate passed it 31 to 2. Id.
73. The effective date of the statute was June 23, 2014, which is the day Governor
Jindal signed the law. Id.
74. Imani Gandy, Vague Louisiana Bill Would Force Brain-Dead Pregnant Women
to Serve as Incubators, RH REALITY CHECK (June 9, 2014, 4:59 PM), http://rhrealitycheck
.org/article/2014/06/09/vague-louisiana-bill-force-brain-dead-pregnant-women-serve
-incubators, archived at http://perma.cc/S27K-APF8. Senator J.P. Morrell “proposed an
amendment to the bill that would have allowed [the patient’s] family members to make
end of life decisions.” Kim, supra note 70. The amendment passed in the Senate, but it
was then rejected by a conference committee comprised of both House and Senate
legislators. Id.
75. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.1(1) (2014).
76. Id. § 40:1299.58.3(A). Similar to the definition in the Texas Advance Directive Act,
a “life-sustaining procedure” is one that “within reasonable medical judgment, would serve
only to prolong the dying process for a person diagnosed as having a terminal and irre-
versible condition . . . .” Id. § 40:1299.58.2(8) (emphasis added). In addition:
“terminal and irreversible condition” means a continual profound comatose
state with no reasonable chance of recovery or a condition caused by injury,
disease, or illness which, within reasonable medical judgment, would pro-
duce death and for which the application of life-sustaining procedures would
serve only to postpone the moment of death.
Id. § 40:1299.58.2(14) (emphasis added). If a woman, however, has experienced an
irreversible total cessation of brain function, she will be considered “dead” in Louisiana,
and thus the terms used in the amendment are inapplicable. See id. § 9:111.A.
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statutory advance directive form in Louisiana does not mention the
effect of pregnancy on a woman’s directive.77
Proposed by State Representative Austin Badon, House Bill 1274
amended Section 40:1299.58.10 of the Louisiana Code78 and states:
It is the policy of the state of Louisiana that human life is of the
highest and inestimable value through natural death. When inter-
preting this Part, any ambiguity shall be interpreted to preserve
human life, including the life of an unborn child if the qualified pa-
tient is pregnant and an obstetrician who examines the woman
determines that the probable postfertilization age of the unborn
child is twenty79 or more weeks and the pregnant woman’s life can
reasonably be maintained in such a way as to permit the contin-
uing development and live birth of the unborn child, and such
determination is communicated to the relevant classes of family
members and persons designated in R.S. 40:1299.58.5.80
Arguably, as with the Texas pregnancy exclusion, this recent
amendment in Louisiana does not apply to a woman who is brain-dead
and pregnant.81 First, the added language is qualified by the pre-
existing language “[w]hen interpreting this Part, any ambiguity shall
be interpreted to preserve human life . . . .” 82 Because a person can
make a written declaration as to when to withhold or withdraw life-
sustaining equipment, the amendment would apply only when a
77. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.3 (2014).
78. House Bill 1274 also amends § 40:1299.64.6(D) of the Louisiana Code. See H.B.
1274, supra note 71.
79. Id. Incorporating a reference to twenty weeks gestation makes the law similar to
a twenty-week abortion ban, which is currently the legal cutoff for abortion in Louisiana.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.30.1.E (2014). In addition, the amended statute permits
“the continuing development and live birth of the unborn child” regardless of the wishes
of the mother’s spouse and other immediate family. H.B. 1274, supra note 71.
80. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.10.E (amending the statute by adding all of the
language after “shall be interpreted to preserve human life”)..
81. See Lamar White, Jr., Everyone is Wrong About Austin Badon’s Bill Requiring
Brain-Dead Pregnant Women to Be on Life Support, Including Austin Badon, CENLAMAR
(June 22, 2014), http://cenlamar.com/2014/06/22/everyone-is-wrong-about-austin-badons
-bill-requiring-brain-dead-pregnant-women-to-be-on-life-support-including-austin-badon,
archived at http://perma.cc/C8UH-W2P2. The majority of news media, however, misre-
ported the application of the amendment proposed by Representative Badon, as they re-
ported that the amendment would force a brain-dead woman to remain on life support.
See, e.g., Laura Bassett, Jindal Mulls Mandatory Life Support for Brain-Dead Pregnant
Women, HUFFINGTON POST (June 9, 2014, 12:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com
/2014/06/09/jindal-signs-bill-to-keep_n_5473633.html, archived at http://perma.cc/4XK7
-U7RR; Marsha Shuler, Bill to Keep Brain-Dead Pregnant Women Alive Heads to Jindal’s
Desk, THE ADVOCATE (June 11, 2014), http://theadvocate.com/news/9344105-123/another
-pro-life-bill-goes-to, archived at http://perma.cc/PEL8-H6QA.
82. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.10.E (2014).
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woman has not expressed her wishes in an end-of-life document or
when her fetus is twenty or more weeks old.83 In other words, under
any circumstance a woman could override the amended statute if:
(1) she expresses her wishes in writing in an end-of-life document,84
or (2) the fetus is under twenty weeks old.85 Second, the amendment
expressly refers to a “qualified patient” 86 and explains that an obste-
trician must examine the woman and determine that her “life can rea-
sonably be maintained.” 87 But, after a physician or other health care
provider declares a pregnant woman “brain-dead,” the woman’s “life”
cannot be maintained because she would be legally dead. As a result,
although the Louisiana legislature took action in response to the
Muñoz case, the amended statute does not provide any clarity when
a woman is brain-dead and pregnant.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IMPLICATED IF THE
PREGNANCY EXCLUSIONS APPLY TO A WOMAN WHO
IS BRAIN-DEAD AND PREGNANT
As described above, although the state pregnancy exclusions
should not be applicable to a woman who is brain-dead and pregnant,
the impact of these statutes would be substantial if they are broadly
interpreted to encompass a brain-dead and pregnant woman.88 Ac-
cordingly, a thorough analysis of the state pregnancy exclusions neces-
sitates an examination of the long line of legal precedent that has
established certain women’s constitutional rights.89 First, a woman’s
83. See id.
84. However, nothing “shall be construed to be the exclusive means by which life-
sustaining procedures may be withheld or withdrawn.” Id. § 40:1299.58.1.A(4). Thus, when
a woman does not have a written advance directive that includes specific instructions in
the event she is pregnant, she should be able to express her wish in some other way, e.g.,
by telling her spouse or another family member.
85. See Kim, supra note 70.
86. A “qualified patient” refers to “a patient diagnosed and certified in writing as
having a terminal and irreversible condition by two physicians who have personally
examined the patient, one of whom shall be the attending physician.” LA. REV. STAT.
§ 40:1299.58.2(11) (2014).
87. Id. § 40:1299.58.10.E.
88. To date, no state or federal court has addressed the specific issue of whether or
not pregnancy exclusions can withstand constitutional scrutiny.
89. Legal scholars have previously addressed the constitutionality of pregnancy clauses
in light of jurisprudence concerning fetal rights and the areas of privacy and abortion. For
excellent analyses, see Molly C. Dyke, Note, A Matter of Life and Death: Pregnancy Clauses
in Living Will Statutes, 70 B.U. L. REV. 867, 869–81 (1990); James M. Jordan, Note, Incu-
bating for the State: The Precarious Autonomy of Persistently Vegetative and Brain-Dead
Pregnant Women, 22 GA. L. REV. 1103, 1115–26, 1135–54 (1988); Hope E. Matchan &
Kathryn E. Sheffield, Comment, Adding Constitutional Depravation to Untimely Death:
South Dakota’s Living Will Pregnancy Provision, 37 S.D. L. REV. 388, 403–08 (1992);
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constitutional right to have an abortion90 is implicated in the situation
when a woman is brain-dead and pregnant. Second, a woman’s fun-
damental right to refuse medical treatment is implicated under
these circumstances.91
A. Right to Terminate a Pregnancy
Certain fundamental rights are protected despite the lack of ex-
press language in the Constitution or Bill of Rights.92 One such right
is the right to privacy, which is “founded in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state ac-
tion.” 93 The scope of this constitutional right likely determines the
constitutionality of statutory pregnancy exclusions, and thus Roe
and Casey must be analyzed in order to provide context for dealing
with the situation in which a woman is brain-dead and pregnant.94
In Roe v. Wade, the United State Supreme Court held that a
fundamental right to privacy under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment ensured a woman’s right to privacy, which
is broad enough to encompass a woman’s right to have an abortion.95
The Court used a temporal framework in order to balance the state’s
Elizabeth Carlin Benton, Note, The Constitutionality of Pregnancy Clauses in Living Will
Statutes, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1821, 1826 (1990); Kristeena L. Johnson, Note, Forcing Life
on the Dead: Why the Pregnancy Exemption Clause of the Kentucky Living Will Directive
Act is Unconstitutional, 100 KY. L.J. 209, 212 (2011); see also Sisti, supra note 10, at 155
(“[I]t is necessary to analyze both the liberty interest and the privacy interest to determine
if the State is infringing upon the patient’s right to direct her medical care and her right
to choose.”).
90. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
91. See Cruzan v. Dir., Missouri Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). In addition to
a woman’s constitutional right to terminate a pregnancy and her right to forego medical
treatment, a woman’s equal protection rights may be implicated if the pregnancy ex-
clusions apply to a woman who is brain-dead and pregnant. See supra note 14 and ac-
companying text.
92. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
93. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153; see also Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485–86 (recognizing the right
to privacy in regard to procreation and invalidating a state provision that prohibited a
married couple’s use of contraceptives).
94. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 89, at 218.
95. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152–53; see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)
(recognizing that “[i]f the right to privacy means anything, it is the right of the individ-
ual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental instruction into matters
so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”).
But see Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 517–20 (1989) (holding that a state
statute limiting the use of public employees and facilities for abortions is not an uncon-
stitutional burden on a woman’s right to an abortion and allowing the state to regulate
abortions during the second trimester).
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interest in a fetus and the mother’s right to control her own body.96
Further, the Court explained that a state may regulate abortion to
promote the health of the mother.97
Then, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey, the Court reaffirmed a woman’s right to abortion, but the plu-
rality dismissed the temporal framework established in Roe v. Wade.98
In regard to viability of a fetus, the Court explained that a fetus might
be considered viable at twenty-three weeks rather than at twenty-
eight weeks.99 The plurality also explained viability as the point at
which a state’s interest in the fetus may outweigh a woman’s right to
abortion.100 It is the point of “viability [that] marks the earliest point
at which the State’s interest in fetal life is constitutionally adequate
to justify a legislative ban on nontherapeutic abortions.”101
In making its decision, the Court utilized the “undue burden”
standard to assess the abortion laws, which in effect diminished
abortion as a fundamental right.102 The State’s interest in the fetus
does not become a compelling interest until the point of viability.103
96. The Court explained that the state’s interest increased as prenatal life advanced.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 163–66. If a woman is less than one trimester into her pregnancy, the
state does not have a legitimate interest to interfere with her decision to continue with
the pregnancy or to terminate her pregnancy. Id. at 162–63.
97. Id. at 164–65.
98. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 872-73 (1992). In general,
the plaintiff in Casey challenged several provisions under The Pennsylvania Abortion
Act, including a spousal notification rule requiring a woman to give prior notice to her
husband, a required 24-hour waiting period, and an informed consent rule requiring a
woman to receive information about the health risks related to the abortion procedure.
Id. at 844–45.
99. Id. at 860–61; City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 428
(1983) (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 163) (defining “viability” as “the point at which the fetus
‘has the capability of meaningful life outside of the mother’s [uterus]’ ”); Burch, supra note
14, at 545 n.111 (quoting Mary Mahowald, Beyond Abortion: Refusal Caesarean Section,
3 BIOETHICS 106, 111 (1989)) (viability means that “the fetus’s condition is such that it can
survive after birth with help from neonatal intensive care”).
100. Casey, 505 U.S. at 870–71.
101. Id. at 860.
102. Id. at 874–77 (explaining that the strict scrutiny standard no longer applied to
abortion law and defining the “undue burden” standard as “the purpose or effect of placing
a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus”).
103. Id. at 860. In this regard, currently forty-two states have enacted abortion
restrictions at different stages of pregnancy. State Policies in Brief: An Overview of Abor-
tion Laws, GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE (Aug. 2014), http://www.guttmacher.org/sections
/abortion.php, archived at http://perma.cc/P25H-8FHR. Although, state gestational limits
that are less than viability are constitutionally suspect under both Roe and Casey. See,
e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-1304 (West 2013) (banning abortion at twelve weeks of
pregnancy, when a fetal heartbeat can typically be detected); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN.
§ 14.02.1-05.1 (West 2012) (banning abortion as soon as a heart beat is detectable). Of
course, both the Arkansas and North Dakota laws have been challenged in court as being
unconstitutional, and the courts have prevented them from going into effect while the
cases move through the appellate court system. See MKB Mgmt. Corp. v. Burdick, 954
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Accordingly, a state cannot impose an “undue burden” on a woman’s
ability to make a decision to terminate her pregnancy without violat-
ing her Due Process rights.104 A state may, however, enact laws to
ensure “informed consent.”105
B. Right to Refuse Medical Treatment
It is also well established in common law that a competent or
incompetent person has the right to refuse or forego medical treat-
ment,106 and this right “usually parallels analysis of the privacy
rights found in Griswold and Roe.”107 This right is based on the doc-
trine of informed consent and generally encompasses “the right of a
competent individual to refuse medical treatment.”108
For example, in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of
Health, Nancy Cruzan suffered brain damage due to oxygen depri-
vation after she was involved in a car accident.109 The hospital used
F. Supp. 2d 900, 903 (D.N.D. 2013); Edwards v. Beck, 8 F. Supp. 3d 1091, 1101 (E.D.
Ark. 2014); see also Isaacson v. Horne, 716 F.3d 1213, 1222–25 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied,
134 S. Ct. 905 (2014) (holding that the Arizona statute prohibiting abortion beginning at
twenty-weeks gestation violated the right of women to make the ultimate decision to ter-
minate a pregnancy prior to fetal viability).
104. Casey, 505 U.S. at 874.
105. Id. at 885–87 (finding that a 24-hour waiting period, intended to ensure the woman
was informed of her choices, did not constitute an undue burden). Twenty-six states cur-
rently require a woman to wait a specific amount of time before she can obtain an abor-
tion, usually twenty-four hours. See 2013 State Level Abortion Restrictions: An Extreme
Overreach into Women’s Reproductive Health Care, NATIONAL WOMEN’S LAW CENTER
(Jan. 28, 2014), http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/2013_state_legislation_fact
sheet_1-27-14.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/F4CS-VR56.
106. The first court decision to validate an advance directive at the state level was In 
re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976). In that case, Karen Ann Quinlan’s father requested
the ability to make legally binding health care decisions on her behalf. Id. at 651. Among
other things, the court held that an individual, whether competent or incompetent, had the
right to forego medical treatment. Id. at 662–64. And, although the case did not involve an
incompetent or brain-dead woman who was pregnant, it illustrates a person’s constitu-
tional right to refuse medical treatment.
107. Dyke, supra note 89, at 874; MacAvoy-Snitzer, supra note 28, at 1287 (pointing out
that Roe v. Wade addressed a broad right to privacy and not only a right when a woman
seeks to have an abortion; thus, the decision to forego life-sustaining treatment may also
be protected by the right of privacy of liberty); see also Amy Lynn Jerdee, Note, Breaking
Through the Silence: Minnesota’s Pregnancy Presumption and the Right to Refuse Medi-
cal Treatment, 84 MINN. L. REV. 971, 997–1000 (2000).
108. Cruzan v. Dir., Missouri Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 277 (1990). However, the
right of a person to refuse medical treatment is not absolute. See Burch, supra note 14,
at 529. The right still must be balanced against the state’s interests in its role as parens
patriae. Id. Thus, courts should consider the following interests when balancing a person’s
right to refuse medical treatment against the state’s countervailing interests: “(1) the
preservation of life; (2) the protection of interests of innocent third parties; (3) the preven-
tion of suicide; and (4) the maintenance of the ethical integrity of the medical profession.”
Id. at 529 n.7.
109. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 266; see also Sharon E. Hollins, Something Worth Writing
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life-sustaining equipment because she was in a persistent vegetative
state.110 Prior to the accident, she had verbally expressed her wish not
to be on life support in the event she was injured; therefore, her par-
ents requested that the doctors withdrawal the life-sustaining medi-
cal treatment.111 In its decision, the Court recognized that a person has
a constitutionally protected liberty interest to refuse life-sustaining
medical treatment and also suggested that living will statutes are
constitutional.112 Further, the Court held that the State could require
clear and convincing evidence proving that the patient had a desire
to have life-sustaining medical treatment withheld or removed.113
C. University Health Services, Inc. v. Piazzi
Although a woman has the constitutional right to terminate a
pregnancy and the right to refuse medical treatment, the existence
of a pregnant woman’s privacy interests is less clear in the instance
where an advance directive is triggered by a doctor declaring her
brain-dead.114 The main case that addresses this specific issue is
University Health Services, Inc. v. Piazzi, in which the hospital filed
Home About: Clear and Convincing Evidence, Living Wills, and Cruzan v. Director,
Missouri Department of Health, 22 U. TOL. L. REV. 871, 882–83 (1991).
110. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 266.
111. See id. at 268.
112. Id. at 281, 291–92.
113. More specifically, the Court held that life-sustaining medical treatment should
not be withheld from Nancy Cruzan because her parents could not show that their daugh-
ter desired not to have such treatment. Id. at 284–85. Her parents argued that she made
statements to her roommate “that she would not want to live should she face life as a
‘vegetable,’ and other observations to the same effect.” Id. at 285. But, this comment and
other observations did not specifically deal with the withholding or withdrawal of life-
sustaining treatment. Id. As a result, the Court found that it was permissible for the  trial
court to require clear and convincing evidence of Nancy Cruzan’s end-of-life wishes be-
fore a healthcare provider could be ordered to withdraw life-sustaining treatment from
a incompetent person. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 286–87; see also In re Westchester Cnty. Med.
Ctr. ex rel. O’Connor, 531 N.E.2d 607, 613 (N.Y. 1988) (holding that the existence of an
advance directive made while a woman was competent was clear and convincing evi-
dence of the woman’s intent to have life-sustaining treatment withheld or withdrawn).
114. See MacAvoy-Snitzer, supra note 28, at 1297. And, in reality, a plaintiff may never
have the standing necessary to pursue a challenge to a statutory pregnancy exclusion. See
Gabrynowicz v. Heitkamp, 904 F. Supp. 1061, 1064 (D.N.D. 1995) (holding that a woman
challenging the pregnancy exclusion did not have a justiciable claim); DiNino v. State ex
rel. Gorton, 684 P.2d 1297, 1301 (Wash. 1984) (dismissing the plaintiff’s claims because
she was not pregnant and did not have a terminal condition; thus, she did not have stand-
ing to challenge the statute). Yet, a pregnancy exclusion is arguably analogous to an abor-
tion statute because it deals with the termination of a pregnancy; thus, a woman should
be allowed to challenge a pregnancy exclusion before she is in a condition that triggers the
exclusion. See MacAvoy-Snitzer, supra note 28, at 1292–94. But see Daniel Sperling, Mater-
nal Brain Death, 30 AM. J.L. & MED. 453, 464–65 (2004) (explaining that perhaps the Roe
decision cannot easily be applied when a woman is brain-dead and pregnant).
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a petition for a declaratory judgment asserting that life support sys-
tems should be maintained for Donna Piazzi to preserve the life of her
unborn child.115 In late June of 1986, Donna Piazzi, who was pregnant
at the time, was transported to the hospital in an unconscious condi-
tion, and at some point after her condition deteriorated, her physician
declared her brain-dead.116 Unfortunately, her end-of-life wishes were
unknown.117 And, by July 25th the fetus was 20½ weeks, but her phy-
sician determined that the fetus was not viable because it was not
capable of surviving outside of her womb.118 A dispute arose because
Donna Piazzi’s husband, who was undisputedly not the father of the
unborn child, requested that the hospital withhold life-sustaining
medical treatment, which would render death to the fetus.119 The un-
born child’s father,120 however, “requested that the hospital maintain
life support systems for Donna Piazzi in order that the fetus [could]
be given the opportunity to develop and survive.”121
In its findings of fact, the court explained that “[t]here exists a
reasonable possibility that with continued life support Donna Piazzi’s
body can remain functioning until the point that the fetus would be
viable and could be delivered with a reasonable possibility of sur-
vival.”122 Further, the findings of fact stated that “[i]f the fetus is
delivered and survives there is a possibility it will suffer from abnor-
malities such as mental retardation, but it was and is impossible to
determine the existence of such abnormalities prior to birth.”123
In general, the Piazzi court held that any constitutional privacy
rights Donna Piazzi possessed were extinguished by her death.124 In
115. Daniel Sperling, Do Pregnant Women Have (Living) Will?, 8 J. HEALTH CARE L.
& POL’Y 331, 336 (2005); Dyke, supra note 89, at 871 (citing the unreported case Univ.
Health Servs. v. Piazzi, No. CV86-RCCV-464 (Ga. Super. Ct. Aug. 4, 1986)); see also Jordan,
supra note 89, at 1108–09.
116. Univ. Health Serv. v. Piazzi, 2 ISSUES L. & MED. 415, 415–16 (Ga. Super. Ct.
Aug. 4, 1986), available at http://www.thaddeuspope.com/images/Univrsity_Health_v
_Piazzi_Ga_Sup_1986_.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/A6D5-NAZ8 [hereinafter Piazzi
Order].
117. Sperling, supra note 115, at 336.
118. Piazzi Order, supra note 116, at 416.
119. Id. at 416. Also, the Division of Family and Children Services argued that the court
did not have jurisdiction in the case because the decision should be a medical decision and
not a legal decision. Id. The court, however, held that it did have “jurisdiction to decide
whether the life of the unborn fetus should be protected.” Id. at 416–17.
120. Id. at 416.
121. Piazzi Order, supra note 116, at 416. The court appointed a guardian ad litem to
“represent the interest of the unborn child. The guardian ad litem request[ed] that life
support systems be maintained.” Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 417–18 (citing Roe v. Wade for the proposition that a “state may assert
interest in protecting potential life,” but not providing any authority for concluding that
Donna Piazzi did not have any interest at all).
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other words, the court decided that she no longer had any interests,
so her wishes (had she expressed any) were irrelevant.125 The court
also looked to case law and the Georgia statute that specifically re-
stricted the effect of a living will when a woman is pregnant and found
that the State supported the policy of protecting life.126 The court ex-
plained that the “public policy in Georgia requires the maintenance
of life support systems for a brain dead mother so long as there exists
a reasonable possibility that the fetus may develop and survive.”127
The court, however, failed to cite any specific authority for the prop-
osition that a woman’s constitutional privacy rights, e.g., the right
of a woman to abort a non-viable fetus, are extinguished upon brain
death.128 And, at no point did the court address any other legally recog-
nized interests that remain after death129 or how the State could have
a compelling interest in a non-viable fetus.130 Moreover, the court
implied that even if Donna Piazzi did have a right to privacy under
these circumstances, any interest she had would be irrelevant under
the Georgia living will statute.131 Of course, the applicability of a
125. Some scholars have argued that upon death, a patient ceases to be a person “in the
eyes of the law,” and thus his or her right to determine what happens no longer exists.
Gregorian, supra note 28, at 404 (citing Nicola S. Peart et al., Maintaining a Pregnancy
Following Loss of Capacity, 8 MED. L. REV. 275, 291 (2000)); Sperling, supra note 115, at
479; David R. Field, et al., Maternal Brain Death During Pregnancy: Medical and Ethical
Issues, 260 JAMA 816, 821 (1988); Norman Fost & Laura M. Purdy, Case Study: The Baby
in the Body, 24 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 31, 32 (1994)). Others argue that “a constitutional right
to make future directives that bind oneself directly or through an agent has no constitu-
tional precedent and poses many problems.” John A. Robertson, Advance Directives, Rights,
and Brain Death Pregnancies, BILL OF HEALTH (Mar. 24, 2014), http://blogs.law.harvard
.edu/billofhealth/2014/03/24/advance-directives-rights-and-brain-death-pregnancies/,
archived at http://perma.cc/3EPX-WDF7 (arguing that “there is no constitutional right to
make a directive at Time 1 that binds at Time 2”). Yet, the American legal system promotes
other interests that are protected after death, and the right to refuse medical treatment
should apply after death as well. See MacAvoy-Snitzer, supra note 28, at 1297–98. For
example, a parent’s interest in child rearing also can transcend death in the case of guard-
ianship appointments. Id. at 1298.
126. Piazzi Order, supra note 116, at 417–18.
127. Id. at 418.
128. Id.
129. See MacAvoy-Snitzer, supra note 28, at 1297–98; Sperling, supra note 115, at 480
(“[T]he view that a brain-dead patient is deprived of rights or interests, and exists solely
as a corpse . . . goes against most of our societal norms, which accord great respect and rev-
erence for the dead and sanctity for their bodies.”); Jordan, supra note 89, at 1165 (“Brain
death does not extinguish the rights of a woman over her body, because a statutory stan-
dard of death cannot arbitrarily limit a fundamental constitutional right, and because her
bodily control also derives from a posthumous property right in her own cadaver.”); Kirsten
Rabe Smolensky, Rights of the Dead, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 763, 771–72 (2008) (discussing
that courts have recognized that persons who are medically dead still have certain con-
stitutional rights).
130. MacAvoy-Snitzer, supra note 28, at 1298; Piazzi Order, supra note 116, at 418.
131. MacAvoy-Snitzer, supra note 28, at 1283–84.
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pregnancy exclusion to a pregnant woman who has been declared
brain-dead would vary from state to state.132
D. Application to Pregnancy Exclusions
Based on legal precedent establishing a woman’s rights, cer-
tain categories of statutory pregnancy exclusions arguably violate a
woman’s constitutional right to terminate a pregnancy and to refuse
medical treatment.133 First, pregnancy exclusions that automatically
invalidate a woman’s advance directive impose a substantial obstacle
in the path of a woman seeking to terminate her pregnancy when the
fetus is non-viable, and thus likely violate the “undue burden” test
set forth in Casey.134 Moreover, these overly broad exclusions create
a problem when a woman is brain-dead and pregnant: the woman
is obviously unable to communicate her current wish to have what
could be a legal abortion.135 This is the same result for those states
that have a statute with suggested language from the Uniform Rights
of the Terminally Ill Act (URITA).136 The terms “probable” and “live
birth” are vague and overbroad because any stage of pregnancy may
fall under this umbrella language.137 In other words, doctors could
consider a woman who is only four weeks pregnant to have a fetus
that will reach the “probable live birth” stage.138 As a result, denying
enforcement of an advance directive when a brain-dead woman is
pregnant with a nonviable fetus appears to be an “undue burden” on
both her right to terminate a pregnancy and her right to refuse
132. GREENE & WOLFE, supra note 32, at 3–5.
133. See supra notes 33, 34 (listing state statutes that automatically invalidate an ad-
vance directive and listing state statutes that follow the potential for “live birth” approach).
134. GREENE & WOLFE, supra note 32, at 5. In other words, the statutes that automati-
cally invalidate a pregnant woman’s living will or advance directive and the statutes that
may invalidate a woman’s wishes when her fetus is not viable arguably violate both a
woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy and her right to refuse life-sustaining treatment.
Id. In addition, the pregnancy exclusion in twelve states does not distinguish between
being a day pregnant and being eight months pregnant. This creates a problem because
“[t]reating all instances of pregnancy as voiding a woman’s right not to be treated is far
too broad an intrusion on her autonomy, privacy and liberty,” and “even when applied
correctly, [the law] affords no choice in the face of uncertainty and doubt about the health
of the fetus, which reasonable people might have.” Caplan & Pope, supra note 5.
135. GREENE & WOLFE, supra note 32, at 5. Furthermore, the pregnancy exclusions
that automatically invalidate the woman’s end-of-life documents preclude a pregnant
woman who is seeking to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment from obtaining
an abortion under any circumstance. Id.
136. Id. at 5–6.
137. Id.; see also supra note 33 (listing states that follow the URTIA approach).
138. This also creates uncertainty in the medical field because doctors cannot determine
when a non-viable fetus has developed to the point in which it will have a “ ‘probable live
birth.’ ” GREENE & WOLFE, supra note 32, at 6.
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medical treatment. Indeed, only when a fetus has become viable may
the state’s interest in the fetus become compelling.139
Furthermore, the few states that use the term “viability” in
pregnancy exclusions may also have an inherent problem with the ap-
plication of the law.140 The problem is that society continues to debate
what the term “viability” actually means.141 Courts are reluctant to
define “viability,”142 and the scientific community continues to dis-
agree about when a fetus becomes viable.143 In addition, this language
puts doctors in the position of having to determine viability on a case-
by-case basis, thus putting them “in charge of determining the fate
of their patients.”144
Finally, in states where the laws do not address a woman’s rights
in the event she is pregnant when doctors declare her brain dead,
women are left even more uncertain about whether their end-of-life
wishes will be honored.145
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
The current state advance directive statutes are inadequate in
addressing the dilemma posed by the Muñoz v. Joseph Peter Smith
Hospital case. A woman should not have to forfeit her end-of-life
decision-making power to the state when doctors have declared her
brain-dead, as she deserves to have her wishes honored and her con-
stitutional rights respected in the event she suffers brain death when
pregnant with a nonviable fetus.146
The changes that are necessary to clarify the current pregnancy
exclusions involve a two-step process. First, each state legislature
should pass a statute or amend the current pregnancy exclusion.147
Second, legislatures should amend any statutory forms that relate
to end-of-life decisions. Similarly, attorneys who draft end-of-life doc-
uments for their female clients who are of child-bearing age should
include specific language addressing the situation in which a woman
139. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163–65 (1973); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 876–77 (1992). According to Roe and its prodigy, at this viability stage the
state may prohibit an abortion unless the mother’s health is in danger. Roe, 410 U.S. at
164–65. Further, “pre-viability, the state’s interest in keeping a brain dead woman on
life-sustaining treatment is not compelling.” Gregorian, supra note 28, at 420.






146. Gregorian, supra note 28, at 419.
147. See Burch, supra note 14, at 565–70.
694 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 21:669
is brain-dead and pregnant. In addition, health care providers should
discuss the issue with their female patients.148
A. Changes to Pregnancy Exclusions
State legislatures first need to propose legislation proactively to
create or amend pregnancy clauses to clarify what doctors and hos-
pitals should do when a woman is brain-dead and pregnant.149 The
specific solution for each state legislature will depend, of course, on
the state’s current approach to the effect of pregnancy on a woman’s
advance directive.150
To clear up any potential ambiguity about whether the pregnancy
exclusion applies to a brain-dead woman, a simple solution is to add
a line into the provision that nullifies it if the woman has been de-
clared brain-dead.151 Using the current Texas pregnancy exclusion
as an example, the revised statute could readily be amended by add-
ing a new subsection (b):
(a) A person may not withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treat-
ment under this subchapter from a pregnant patient.
148. Some health care providers are required to discuss advance directives in general
with their patients. See GREENE & WOLFE, supra note 32, at 2–3 (explaining that follow-
ing Cruzan Congress passed the Patient Self-Determination Act of 1991, which requires
certain health care providers receiving federal Medicare or Medicaid funds to discuss an
advance directive with all adult patients).
149. See Burch, supra note 14, at 566–70; see also Jordan, supra note 89, at 1159–60.
150. States should not, however, take the Louisiana approach when drafting or revising
statutory language. The Louisiana amendment in 2014 did not clarify the application of
the law to a woman who is brain dead and pregnant. See discussion supra Part I.B. And,
legislatures should be mindful that the constitutionality of pregnancy exclusions when
applied to a woman who is pregnant is in a coma or in a permanent vegetative state is also
highly questionable. See discussion supra Part II.
151. Two Texas representatives plan to review the pregnancy exclusion during the
2015 legislative session. See Muñoz Case Could Bring Changes to Texas Health Code,
WFAA (Jan. 27, 2014, 8:04 PM), http://www.wfaa.com/news/health/2014/08/20/14162268,
archived at http://perma.cc/C2HJ-5QK2. Representative Garnet Coleman (D-Houston)
thinks the simple fix is to add a line into the statute that nullifies it if the pregnant woman
has already been declared dead. Id. On the other hand, Representative Matt Krause (R-
Fort Worth) wants to add more protections for the fetus and prefers to have a guardian
appointed to protect the interest of the fetus. See H.B. 1901, 84th Leg. Reg. Sess. (Tex.
2015); see also Jason Wheeler, Fort Worth End-of-Life Case May Weigh on Legislature,
WFAA (Nov. 16, 2014, 12:36 PM), http://www.wfaa.com/story/news/local/tarrant-county
/2014/11/17/marlise-munoz-case-may-spur-legislation-in-next-session-in-austin
/19155891/, archived at http://perma.cc/J4TD-F83L (explaining on Inside Texas Politics
that the bill would require a special legal guardian be appointed in future pregnancy life
support situations to represent the fetus). Yet, if the woman is pregnant with a non-viable
fetus, the State probably does not have a “compelling interest” in the potential life of the
fetus. See discussion supra Part II.A.
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(b) Subsection (a) does not apply to a woman who has been
declared brain-dead pursuant to section 671.001 of this Code.152
This proposed language is explicit so that a neither the doctor nor
the hospital will question the applicability of the pregnancy exclu-
sion to a woman who is brain-dead.153
If a state legislature prefers to apply the pregnancy exclusion to
a woman who has been declared brain-dead, the statutory language
must still comport with the woman’s rights.154 Thus, one potential
approach is to include language that hinges on the viability of the
fetus.155 The viability approach would balance the pregnant woman’s
interests and rights against the state’s interests in the woman’s fetus
and would make the pregnancy exclusion consistent with the via-
bility distinction in the abortion context.156
Finally, as an alternative to using viability language, at a
minimum, a state legislature should make the applicability of the
pregnancy exclusion consistent with the state’s abortion law.157 For ex-
ample, if a state allows a woman to have an abortion up to 22 weeks,
then the pregnancy exclusion provision should allow the woman’s
advance directive to be effective if the woman is less than 22 weeks
pregnant.158 Overall, this approach will promote uniformity of laws.
By crafting a statute that includes language that is consistent with the
temporal framework of the state’s abortion law,159 the legislatures
would lift the burden from doctors because they will have an objective
152. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.049 (West 2013). And, because the 
proposed language in subsection (b) would also apply to a brain-dead woman who is preg-
nant with a viable fetus, a state legislature may choose to add additional language to
narrow its application.
153. This proposed language solves the issue when a woman is brain-dead and pregnant.
As previously discussed, the constitutionality of the actual pregnancy exclusion may still
be questioned. See discussion supra Part II.
154. See discussion supra Parts II.A, II.B.
155. Admittedly, the “viability” standard may still pose problems, see supra Part II.A,
but using viability as a benchmark would at least make the pregnancy exclusion constitu-
tional when it comes to the application to a woman who is brain-dead and pregnant.
156. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870–71 (1992).
157. This approach assumes that the state’s abortion law is constitutional.
158. Louisiana’s recent amendment does take this approach to the age of the fetus, but
other problems with the added statutory language render it inapplicable to a woman who
is brain-dead and pregnant. See discussion supra Part I.B.
159. This forces the question: Do the requirements for a valid living will satisfy the
informed-consent requirements? See Sperling, supra note 115, at 486–90; see also Sisti,
supra note 10, at 164. To ensure that any potential problem with informed consent is ad-
dressed, it would be prudent to include a provision in the advance directive that the woman
has complied with the informed consent laws of the state, and a woman could also sign her
advance directive after she has waited for the required time period to comply with any
informed consent law. Sisti, supra note 10, at 164.
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way of determining whether to withhold or withdraw the woman’s
life-sustaining treatment when she has been declared brain-dead.160
In any event, state legislatures should endeavor to either ex-
press that a pregnancy exclusion (1) does not apply to a woman who
is brain-dead and pregnant, (2) applies only if the brain-dead woman
is pregnant with a viable fetus, or (3) applies only if the brain-dead
woman is less than a certain number of weeks pregnant, consistent
with the state’s abortion law. The failure to make changes to the cur-
rent statutory schemes will result in a woman’s end-of-life wishes not
being honored and will leave doctors and hospitals second-guessing
the intent of the pregnancy exclusion.161
B. Changes to Language in Advance Directives
In addition to the state legislatures enacting changes to their
pregnancy exclusions, specific language in a woman’s end-of-life doc-
uments should be included to express her end-of-life wishes in the
event she is pregnant when she is declared brain-dead. Accomplishing
this change will require statutory changes to suggested or manda-
tory advance directive forms as well as changes to the way attorneys
and health care providers proactively discuss the rare and unfortu-
nate situation with their respective clients and patients.
First, for further consistency, any advance directive forms in a
state’s statutory scheme should be amended to include language ad-
dressing the potential for brain death and pregnancy.162 In this regard,
the statutory forms should include a special provision contemplating
pregnancy and expressing the woman’s wish for life-sustaining treat-
ment to be withheld or withdrawn even if she were pregnant. Such
language in the forms should be consistent with the overall approach
the state legislature takes; for example, if a state takes the viability
approach discussed in Part III.A, the language in the statutory form
could read as follows163:
If a physician should declare my brain death while I am pregnant,
and if at the time of my brain death a physician determines that
160. See Burch, supra note 14, at 566 n. 231.
161. See supra text accompanying note 151.
162. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8A-4(h) (West 2014); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3262
(West 2014); see also A.B. 861, 2013–14 Leg., 101st Sess. (Wis. 2013), available at https://
docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/2013/related/proposals/ab861, archived at http://perma.cc/835Z
-Y3DY (legislation introduced by Representatives Taylor (D-Madison) and Berceau (D-
Madison), the Pregnancy Protection Package seeks to remove the statutory pregnancy
exclusion from the statutory advance directive form).
163. See Burch, supra note 14, at 565–68 (explaining a broader proposal that would
address the effect of an advance directive during pregnancy).
2015] “BUT I’M BRAIN-DEAD AND PREGNANT” 697
to a reasonable degree of medical certainty the fetus is not viable,
then I wish that life-sustaining medical treatment be withheld
or withdrawn and that the fetus be allowed to die naturally in
my body.
Second, attorneys and health care providers need to be proactive
when communicating with a woman of child-bearing age when she
plans her end-of-life documents.164 Attorneys should include a ques-
tion on their advance directive checklist and discuss the issue during
the initial interview with any woman of child-bearing age.165 Simi-
larly, because advance directives instruct health care providers about
medical care that a person would or would not want to have in the
event he or she becomes incompetent, health care providers should
discuss the issue during their standard prenatal interview. By dis-
cussing a woman’s wishes in the event she is declared brain-dead
when pregnant and then having the woman execute the appropriate
end-of-life documents, no one will have to question her wishes later.166
164. See GREENE & WOLFE, supra note 32, at 7 (suggesting an amendment to the Patient
Self-Determination Act in order to require health care providers to inform a woman of
her rights when creating her advance directive, as the Act provides no guidance on the
issue of pregnancy exclusions).
165. As previously mentioned, an attorney may want to include a provision in the ad-
vance directive that the woman has complied with the informed consent laws of the state,
to the extent she can considering she may not be pregnant when she executes the advance
directive. See supra text accompanying note 159.
166. Unfortunately, the large majority of the population does not have a written, ad-
vance directive. Glenn Cohen, Negotiating Death: ADR and End of Life Decision-Making,
9 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 253, 283 (2004). In the event the woman does not express her
wishes in an advance directive, the woman’s decision to withhold or withdraw life-sus-
taining treatment should still be honored. Of course, having a written  advance directive,
even without language specifically addressing a potential pregnancy, could still constitute
“clear and convincing” evidence of the woman’s intent to be removed from life-sustaining
treatment. See Cruzan v. Dir. Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 284–87 (1990).
Furthermore, the common law doctrine of substituted judgment is a  means by which
the courts may address a brain-dead, pregnant woman without an effective advance di-
rective. Burch, supra note 14, at 563–65. Courts typically apply a “substituted judgment
standard” when a woman is no longer competent and she did not express her wishes. Id.;
see, e.g., TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.039(b) (West 2013) (explaining the
priority of persons who may make a treatment decision, including a decision to withhold
or withdraw life-sustaining treatment, include the following: “(1) the patient’s spouse,
(2) the patient’s reasonably available adult children, (3) the patient’s parents, or (4) the
patient’s nearest living relative”).
For example, in the case of In re A.C., the issue involved a woman’s right to decline
medical treatment, i.e., a caesarean section for a cancer-associated death at twenty-six
weeks of gestation. 573 A.2d 1235, 1237–38 (D.C. 1990). The court identified the follow-
ing factors to be considered when determining how to proceed with a woman who is no
longer competent: (1) the person’s written and oral directions concerning treatment to
family, friends, and health care providers; (2) the person’s past decisions concerning
medical treatment; and (3) the person’s value system. Id. at 1249–51; see also Mary R.
Anderlik, End-of-Life Decision-Making for Pregnant Women, HEALTH L. & POLICY INST.
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CONCLUSION
The tragic situation in which a woman is pregnant at the time she
is declared brain-dead is rare circumstance, but it warrants action
to ensure that a woman’s end-of-life wishes are honored and respected
by her family, health care providers, and the state. Current state stat-
utes addressing the effect of an advance directive on a pregnant
woman’s wishes arguably do not apply in the event of a woman’s brain
death, as the plain language of the statutes dictate that they apply
to a living woman, not a woman who is brain-dead.167
Moreover, even if the statutory pregnancy exclusions are deemed
to apply to a woman who is brain-dead and pregnant, then the exclu-
sions arguably violate a woman’s constitutional rights.168 A woman’s
right to terminate her pregnancy when the fetus is non-viable is vio-
lated, and her right to refuse medical treatment is also violated.169
To remedy these problems, state legislatures first should either
draft a statute or amend the language in their pregnancy exclusions
to clarify the applicability to a woman who is brain-dead and preg-
nant. In addition, end-of-life planning documents need to include
clear language that expresses the woman’s wishes in the event she
is declared brain-dead when she is pregnant. Correspondingly, state
legislatures also need to amend the statutory forms for advance di-
rectives, and both attorneys and health care providers should be pro-
active and discuss the issue with their respective clients and patients.
Not taking such measures will lead to repeats of the Muñoz v. John
Peter Smith Hospital case and place a woman’s important end-of-life
decisions in the hands of the courts.
(Aug. 12, 1999), http://www.law.uh.edu/healthlaw/perspectives/Reproductive/990812EOL
Decisions.html, archived at http://perma.cc/JC77-R7PK. If uncertainty remains, the court
should then consider “what most [people] would likely do in a similar situation . . .
[including] the viability of the fetus . . . .” In re A.C., 573 A.2d at 1251; see also Benton,
supra note 89, at 1826 (“[R]isk of psychological harm to the woman’s partner and family
must [also] be considered when a pregnant woman’s body is maintained against her
express wishes.”).
Moreover, it has been suggested that when the woman’s post-mortem wishes are in
dispute or cannot be determined, the biological father’s interests and role should be given
greater weight. Gregorian, supra note 28, at 422 (“When the mother’s wishes are unknown
and cannot be determined, her judgment cannot be substituted and her interests cannot
be protected over the interest of the biological father. At that point, courts should defer to
the judgment of the biological father, giving his preference priority.”). But see Sperling,
supra note 115, at 491 (arguing that the biological father should be allowed to “reflect”
on the woman’s wishes, but not be able to “determine this understanding”).
167. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8A-4(h) (West 2014); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3262
(West 2014).
168. See discussion supra Parts II.A, II.B.
169. See discussion supra Parts II.A, II.B.
